

James Burnham

CAN WASHINGTON CONDUCT POLITICAL WARFARE?

THREE FACTS are the only triangulation points by which a firm course of foreign policy can be charted in our time:

1. The world political system is in the midst of a transformation which goes beneath and beyond the limits of the national and colonial order that prevailed during the past several centuries.

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*Last month James Burnham argued in "The Primacy of Politics" that the containment program is based on two illusory assumptions: that Communism starts in the stomach and can be stopped by alleviating economic distress; and that if war does come, our superior military power will save us from the consequences of our political ineptitude. In this second of two articles taken from his forthcoming Containment or Liberation? (John Day), Mr. Burnham holds that the only alternative to unlimited nuclear warfare is an aggressive program of political warfare. Mr. Burnham's most recent book was The Coming Defeat of Communism.*

2. For the period of this transformation there is no clear line between war and peace. There are only different forms and stages of the continuous struggle for survival or dominance in the developing world system of the future.

3. The primary mode of the struggle is *political warfare*.

By "political warfare" I refer to methods of struggle other than those of formal military warfare, insofar as these methods are guided by a strategic objective.

Although they differ on its role, all military strategists agree that the advent of air power has added a "new dimension" to warfare's traditional land and sea. Outside of Communist circles, few military strategists or governmental leaders yet comprehend that another, a fourth dimension, more novel and decisive than the third, has simultaneously appeared. Air power alters the tactics and mechanics of war, but does

not bring any qualitative change in the nature of war, nor reach into any new layers of the human mind and spirit. Political warfare demands a radical shift in both conception and practice.

In thirty years (1921-51) Soviet-based Communism conquered China, the most heavily populated country on earth. This immense victory was won almost entirely with the weapons of political warfare. The amount and scale of formal fighting, the equipment used, and the casualties in the field were negligible in relation to such a goal. It is doubtful that the Communist high command spent as much as half a billion dollars on the whole thirty-year campaign, certainly less than a billion. From 1946 to the end of 1952 it took more than seven billion for the French to maintain a shaky stalemate in Indo-China. The United States has used much more than a billion merely to keep a thin line open to the single city of Berlin.

IN ACHIEVING the conquest of China, Stalin's political warfare included the following measures:

1. A clear policy, first laid down in Theses adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International (1920). This policy had the conquest of China as its unequivocal objective, in order both to add China's weight to the Communist side of the world balance, and to deprive the Western powers of a

major reserve of resources and manpower.

2. The organization of a trained cadre, an *apparatus*, which became the brain and backbone of the Chinese revolution. This was done by sending instructors and organizers from the Soviet Union into China, and by training tens of thousands of Chinese in special Soviet schools.

3. Carefully regulated Soviet pressures and infiltration, open and disguised. The Soviet emissaries ranged from military advisers to saboteurs to economists to spies to engineers. The infiltration extended deep into Chinese society. The pressures gradually gained strategic domination of the land approaches to China: Outer Mongolia; then Sinkiang; and, in the next-to-last phase, Manchuria.

4. Flexible Soviet diplomacy, which demanded here and yielded there, made or broke a treaty as opportunity suggested.

5. Skillful political handling of the Japanese war against China. The Japanese invasion of the mainland (Manchuria, then China proper) was parried in such a way that the threat to Soviet territory was minimized, the Chinese Nationalists undermined, and the Chinese Communists strengthened both materially and morally.

6. Shrewd exploitation of internal Chinese tensions. Agrarian (peasant) discontent was mobilized under Communist leadership. Wide strata

of the intellectuals, professionals, and bureaucrats were penetrated ideologically. Many of the merchants and businessmen were neutralized by fear, indirect bribery, or Pan-Asiatic and anti-foreign slogans.

7. Para-military and military operations, tailored to Chinese geographic, economic, and social conditions.

8. Soviet manipulation of the Western powers, first by entangling them in a Soviet-sparked "anti-Japanese front," and then by snatching key concessions from the conference tables at Teheran and Yalta.

9. Immobilization of Western public opinion by psychological means. In order to conquer China, the Communists had to prevent effective interference by the Western powers, in particular by the United States. This was accomplished by a psychological operation which exercised a controlling influence on Western, especially American, opinion concerning China, and by the actual penetration of relevant Western institutions, both governmental and private.

**D**URING the past few years the term "psychological warfare" has become familiar in the United States. Many popular articles have been written about it. Everyone seems to be "for it," and to agree that we ought to carry on vigorous psychological warfare against Communism and the Soviet Union.

As a matter of fact, what professes to be psychological warfare is being conducted on a rather large scale. Probably more than half of the budget of the Department of State goes to "PW," as psychological warfare is known to its familiars. The Army's special research organization, the Operations Research Office, spends many of its millions on psychological warfare, as does the Air Force's special organization, the Rand Corporation. The Air Force also works in the field through its Human Resources Research Institute. The Central Intelligence Agency has many psychological warfare tasks which are not publicly defined. In connection with the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Agency, huge and expensive psychological projects have been attempted abroad. All of the government's psychological warfare operations are supposed to be "co-ordinated" by the Psychological Strategy Board, which works under the direction of the National Security Council.

Outside of the government proper, the field of psychological warfare has been yielding a heavy crop of varied organizations, some semiofficial, some altogether private, which function both at home and internationally.

The United States is now spending what must total well over a billion dollars yearly on these products that are sold as "psychological war-

fare," and advertised, by those who are paid to turn them out, as high-grade anti-Communist medicine. Let us take a look at the contents as well as the label. Is this American brand of "psychological warfare" the genuine article? Does it actually function within the great new dimension of contemporary international struggle? — in other words, is it an authentic form of *political warfare*? Or is it, perhaps, a substitute for political warfare?

SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE is an expression of *the will to defeat an enemy*. American "psychological warfare" is for the most part an expression of the wish to be loved — so profound a characteristic of American culture. In that contrast is summed up the fact that American psychological warfare is in reality not political warfare or, indeed, warfare in any sense.

A large part of American psychological warfare consists of an "information and education" program, carried out through radio, lectures, movies, books, libraries, student and teacher exchanges, reciprocal traveling, and so on. Its avowed purpose is to clear up "misunderstandings" and to correct "misinformation" concerning the United States. Its message (the Campaign of Truth vs. the Big Lie) is roughly the following:

"The Communists say that we are imperialists, reactionaries, warmong-

ers, and racists. They tell you that we exploit workers and farmers, lynch Negroes, drop germs on peaceful peasants, and plan to make an American colony out of all the world that we leave unatomized. It is not fair for them to say such things, and they are just not so. We Americans want peace and prosperity for all, and it is slander to suggest that we would ever start a war under any circumstances. We hardly ever lynch Negroes any more, and they can now even eat in restaurants and railroad dining cars — at least in some parts of the North. With the way progress is going, they will soon be able to register at hotels. We have never sought territorial gain, except where it is a question of defense or helping a young nation to grow up. We are ready to pay out billions of dollars to bring the benefits of our prosperity and way of life to everywhere in the world. At home, our workers are the richest and happiest anywhere, with cars and bathrooms and vacuum cleaners and television, and it is not true that they are exploited, and they want to be friends with everybody. As for our farmers, why should they want war when they have such big barns and fat cattle and broad fields? Our university graduates are not barbarians, like the Communists say, but they really like art and culture, and we are going to prove it to you by sending over *Oklahoma* and John Gunther and *Porgy and Bess* and *Captain*

from *Castile* and *Quo Vadis* and *Life's* reproductions of paintings. And our leaders are so friendly that they are ready to call you by your first name ten minutes after meeting you."

The curious assumption seems to be that others will love us if they see us as we really are. And why? The only evident reason is that they won't be able to help loving us because we so want to be loved. In their ardent youth, Americans have not yet learned the tragic lesson that the most powerful cannot be loved — hated, envied, feared, obeyed, respected, even honored perhaps, but not loved. Was not the Renunciation of Love the first step in the search for the Treasure of the Nibelungs?

Displayed on the high and opaque fence that surrounds the United States Consulate at Basra in Iraq I saw big photographs of Midwestern farms bursting with new buildings, machinery, and prize cattle. Are the starving and diseased Iraqi peasants and laborers who shuffle past that fence going to love us because they see that our farmers are so rich and well fed? The Marshall Plan propaganda has told the workers of France and Italy that the American standard of living is four times higher than the Soviet. Will those French and Italian workers, in their unpaired, cold, and grimy homes, love us because our workers ride to work in big cars and have steak three

times a week? Will ordinary Rumanians and Balts and Russians love us because we endlessly repeat we will never take the offensive against the regime that crushes them?

How preposterous to suppose that political attacks based on "the Negro question" can be quieted by quoting statistics on lynching and subsidized housing. The fact is (if it were relevant) that American racial tolerance is well above the world average. Not only is the United States far more tolerant and assimulative than countries like South Africa and Australia, with their special problems, but it is more so than many non-white nations such as Japan, China, and India. The Japanese speak contemptuously of the United States as a "mongrel nation." A Chinese family regards a child of mixed Chinese and white parentage as an outcast. Indians are so obsessed by the color question that young bachelors advertising for brides specify light color as a prime requirement.\* This is the fact, but facts have little to do with the political passions that are merely using the Negro and similar issues as adventitious symbols.

IT IS NOT ONLY the information and education part of the American program that expresses the pas-

\* Most inhabitants of India are of course themselves to be classified scientifically as whites. Subjectively, however, Indians usually identify themselves, though ambivalently, with non-whites.

sionate wish to be loved. "Friendly acts" are constantly being performed with the apparent expectation that these will lead to feelings in the recipients if not of love at least of gratitude. It is evidently forgotten how much more bitter it is to receive than to give.

In the late summer of 1952, Moslem pilgrims piled up in Beirut on the way to Mecca. The United States ran a "Magic Carpet" of airplanes to transport thousands of them free and comfortably. Undoubtedly this was done on the inspiration of one of the psychological warriors. Operation Magic Carpet was presumably part of the governmental campaign to "win the Moslem world to our side."

It would be churlish to object to this performance. Humanly speaking, it was a pleasant thing to do. It probably gave the pilots useful training. And I imagine that it made the Beirut authorities happy by getting the penniless pilgrims off their doorstep. At the same time it was almost certainly useless as a psychological warfare action. In the Moslem religion and culture, the feeling which Christians designate as "gratitude" does not exist. Islam teaches that all things, good and bad, come from Allah. The planes that took the pilgrims to Mecca appeared and functioned by and solely by the will of Allah. For that, the pilgrims no doubt gave due praise to Allah. It would have been sacrilegious and

indeed unthinkable for them to feel thanks, gratitude, or obligation toward the American pilots, generals or diplomats. These were the instrument that Allah happened to choose — in this case, *despised infidels*. If these Moslem pilgrims felt anything toward the Americans at all, it was probably nothing but distaste and ironic contempt.

So far as psychological warfare goes, the Arabs have been impressed lately not with the sporadic friendly acts but with the increasing signs that the infidels have grown weak and cowardly. The Christian dogs slink away from their possessions without a fight, and cringingly wait on a Moslem fanatic in his bed-chamber.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE" is a more imposing name for what used to be called "propaganda." Propaganda means the use of the media of communication for the purpose of influencing groups of people in accordance with predetermined political goals. The field of propaganda, though wide, is only a part or subdivision of political warfare. The outline given above of the methods used by the Communists in the conquest of China shows that many of the forms of political warfare are outside of what would usually be classified as propaganda.

It follows as a practical conclusion that the objectives of propaganda

cannot be successfully set beyond the range of general political warfare. The limits of political warfare are in turn fixed by a nation's overall foreign policy. Since 1947 the United States has pursued the policy of containment. American political warfare and American propaganda have therefore necessarily been confined within the perspectives of containment.

This relationship between part and whole is by no means self-evident. It seems to many persons that there is no reason why propaganda cannot perfectly well follow one policy while ordinary diplomacy, commerce, or military preparation follows quite another. It just does not work out that way. If the propaganda is completely out of line with actions taken in other fields, then no one believes the propaganda, and it has no effect. When Hitler went into Byelorussia and the Ukraine in 1941-42, his propaganda said that he arrived to free the peoples from Russian Bolshevism. Byelorussians and Ukrainians were ready to welcome him as a liberator. But when his Nazis treated the Byelorussians and Ukrainians as subhumans, the propaganda was disregarded. It serves no purpose for the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe to tell the Czechs and Poles that America stands for their freedom, if at the same time the State Department keeps officially repeating that it is

always ready to negotiate with a "sincere" Moscow or Peiping on the basis of the present boundaries of the Iron Curtain. Because containment offers no solution for the chief problems of Europe and Asia, and only the prospect of eternal enslavement to the peoples of the Soviet Empire itself, there can be no effective American propaganda before the policy of containment has been abandoned, in action as well as in words.

The United States has made a certain effort to get around the dilemma thus indicated by what amounts to a trick. It has been thought possible for the nation to have two policies: a publicly avowed "overt" policy — the policy of containment, negotiations, and faith in the United Nations; and a secret or "covert" policy which would be much more strongly anti-Soviet, and would in some respects approximate a policy of liberation. The overt policy would govern diplomacy, official propaganda, and behavior at conferences. The covert policy would be carried out by special unacknowledged agencies, secret agents, and private organizations.

**B**UT analysis and experience prove this double deal to be impossible. One of two results follows: either the desired effect of the covert operations is cancelled out by the counter-influence of the overt actions; or the covert operations

degenerate into irresponsibility and adventurism.

Many private or semiofficial activities among exile groups have been caught on one of these horns. The Free Europe University in Exile, for example, was established through American support in 1951, with its resident center at Robert-sau, near Strasbourg. The student body is drawn from the exile youth of the East European captive nations. Implicit in the idea of this university is the perspective of liberation. In fact, the only motive for founding it would seem to be that of preparing selected young persons for the time when their countries will again be free. In practice, the general influence of the policy of containment has smothered the potential dynamism of the University in Exile beneath attitudes of timidity and negativism. In the appointment of staff and tutors, the relations with the neutralist French authorities, the selection of visiting lecturers, and the guidance of special studies, the political content is diluted with the sterile waters of containment. The institution tends to develop as a charity school instead of a fighting instrument of political warfare.

The so-called Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 authorized the expenditure of up to \$100 million "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union,

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes. . . ." The debate over this provision showed that Congress' intent in passing it was to initiate the formation of exile military units. This purpose, like the University in Exile, presupposes the perspective of liberation, and goes counter to the policy of containment. Therefore the containment-committed Administration denied the plain meaning of the amendment (when the Soviet spokesmen attacked it in the United Nations) and sabotaged it in action. The whole business was surrounded by super-secrecy, in order to hide the fact that nothing positive was done except to give a little financial aid to refugees.

Most unofficial or semiofficial activities that depart from the dominant policy of containment simply do not get anywhere. Many of them, indeed, have folded up after bureaucratic flutter and money-spending. Some do show results, but, because these results are out of line with the central policy, they are isolated episodes, anarchic, and



often adventurist. This was strikingly illustrated by the disclosure, in October, 1952, of the German "resistance" group which American "secret agents" had subsidized, trained and armed. The mission of the group was supposed to be resistance activity in the case of Soviet invasion. It was brought out that the group's plans began with the assassination of eighty leading and respectable members of the West German Social Democratic Party.

IN THE SPRING of 1952, an East European political leader came to see me. He is one of the chiefs of the anti-Communist resistance of his country, and since 1942 has been a liaison officer between the internal resistance and the exiles outside. What he told me was in sum the following:

"Something must be done to avert disaster to my country. Americans are sending individuals inside on quick "one-shot" assignments. Someone from ——— [he named a certain organization] will approach an exile and say, 'Make a quick trip inside, get a news story for broadcast use, and we will give you a thousand dollars and a passage out of Europe.' The man goes in. His mission makes no sense, and he has no political or organizational responsibility. Because he is never going back again, he doesn't take precautions or cover his tracks. He just aims to get in and out as fast as he

can. The consequence is that his trail betrays the members of our own internal organization. Sometimes, through carelessness or indifference, he exposes our people; sometimes they, knowing that he comes from outside, feel it their duty to help him and are exposed in the process. Afterwards the police use the obvious traces of his visit as an excuse for repressions."

He went on: "You cannot conduct resistance operations in this cloak-and-dagger adventurist manner. The building of a serious resistance movement in my country or in any Soviet-held nation requires two things. First, there must be a firm policy commitment by your government. Your government must find ways to make it plainly known to the people inside that the United States does not accept the present arrangements as final but stands unambiguously for the liberation of the subject nations of the Soviet Empire. The captive people as a whole, the nation, must feel certain that sooner or later they will be free. All the people, the nation itself, not isolated individuals, must be made the social base of the resistance. Second, the resistance activities, so far as they are possible at each given stage, cannot be carried out as private adventures or commercial purchases. They must be politically and organizationally co-ordinated by a responsible center which includes representatives both

of your government and of the captive nation in question."

IN TESTIMONY before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Professor David N. Rowe of Yale University mentioned the following incident: "I called for a sophisticated, important, and formidable program of political warfare. . . . When I put this up to Mr. [George] Kennan . . . Kennan said, 'That is impossible. We can't do that kind of thing; we don't have people with the kind of know-how to conduct sophisticated political warfare.' "\*

The reply from the formulator of the policy of containment is revealing. If Kennan's remark is interpreted to mean that "people with the kind of know-how to conduct sophisticated political warfare" have not been working for the United States government, I believe his statement to be accurate — though not quite for the reasons which Kennan would doubtless give.

Competence in anti-Communist political warfare comprises two quite different factors. One of these is technical: specific abilities at one or more of a wide range of activities, from coining slogans or guerilla fighting to electronics and explosives. The second is a sufficient knowledge and profound rejection of Communism. Competence of this

double sort has neither existed in Washington nor been sought. Insofar as Washington has been fighting the Soviet-based world Communist enterprise, it has been trying to do so without anti-Communists.

The divisions of the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Psychological Strategy Board, Mutual Security Agency, and other offices supposedly carrying on political warfare are staffed for the most part by routine bureaucrats, or by persons arbitrarily transferred from unrelated tasks. Those who are recruited from civilian life, though sometimes able enough in their own right, are seldom trained technicians in fields related to political warfare. They are usually stock brokers, academic social scientists, lawyers, investment bankers, members of café or conventional society out for a fling at secret missions and Washington salons, or unattached "administrators."

Even the highest technical ability is not enough for effective anti-Communist political warfare. The essential lack in Washington has been of knowledge and passion: lack of a thorough understanding of Communism and of an unwavering commitment to fight against it; lack even of a realization that such understanding and commitment are necessary.

Men and women with this knowledge and commitment exist in the United States, in the other non-

\* *Hearings* on the Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 3990.

Communist countries, and among the exiles from the Soviet Empire. But few are in Washington, or working for or with the agencies of the United States government.

How are we to explain this seeming paradox, the fact that so few anti-Communists are to be found in the headquarters of the world struggle against Communism? The answer lies partly in the American character, partly in a temporary cultural lag, the carry-over of attitudes and ideas developed in an earlier period to a time when they are no longer appropriate.

The circumstances of American history have promoted the strong anti-ideological tendency so marked in most Americans. The American aim is *to do a job*, and the man who has done a job becomes the admired man. Doing the job is not surrounded by theory and moralizing. In government, as in American life generally, the typical American is the "pragmatic" man.

Though not impossible, it is difficult for a person who has no feeling for ideology to comprehend an enterprise like Communism. He tries to make it fit under some "practical" category with which he is familiar — "political party" or "gang" or "aggressor nation." Because Communism has in reality nothing in common with what the practical man understands by party, gang, or nation, he remains *ignorant*.

But he is unaware that he is ignorant, and impatient with anyone who suggests that he must learn more if he is to conduct an effective struggle against Communism and the Soviet power.

Along with the non-ideological majority there has also been, in the United States government, especially in the agencies with some relation to foreign affairs, an ideologized minority. The fact that the majority is not ideologized has given this minority an influence much in excess of its relative numbers. It has set the prevailing tone of the State Department and the various intelligence agencies.

The leading carriers of this ideology are men who were born between 1900 and 1914 — the generation and in many cases the one-time colleagues of Alger Hiss. The ideas and attitudes of these men were shaped in the context of the economic depression of the thirties and the political struggle against Hitler and Nazism. The depression left them disillusioned with traditional American capitalism. "Antifascism" became the core of their political being, a passion as well as an intellectual attitude. In part, their antifascism was a native product of "liberalism" (in the American populist sense). In part, though most of them did not realize this, the specific content of their antifascism was moulded by Communist pressures. Disguised and skillfully guided by

the Popular Front strategy, these worked on them through a hundred channels — the magazines they read, the plays and movies they saw, books they discussed, organizations they joined, conferences they attended, and sometimes the man in the next office or at the next seat around the dinner table.

THEIR VISION of the contemporary world and the forces active within it was subtly distorted — concerning the causes of fascism, the nature of colonialism, the history of the Russian revolution, the laws of economic life, the meaning of art and religion, the process of education, and so much else. At the same time, deep feelings were stirred within them, and attitudes fixed so firmly that it demands an extreme crisis to undo them. Only a few of them became outright Communists or Soviet agents — though in that atmosphere those few could accomplish much. But many of them were brought to believe that the Communists were *allies* — allies, and even leaders, in the common fight against what was worst, against Hitler and Nazism. Communism was not like fascism, not wholly evil as fascism was, because — they were taught without knowing that they were being taught — Communism “has the same ideals that we have, even if we differ on methods.” And their political passion, their hatred, was concentrated and directed

against Nazism. Other political things — nations or churches or even Communism — they might intellectually disagree with and practically reject. It was only about Nazism that they *felt* strongly.

This complex of ideas and attitudes prevailed, appropriately enough, through the period of war in alliance with Stalin against Hitler. Suddenly, in 1946, the men formed in that ideological pattern, occupying the key posts of government, were confronted through a sharp turn of history’s wheel by a task never dreamt of in their philosophy. Now they were called on to be leaders in the fight against their former associates, the Communists, and against “the great Soviet experiment.” Small wonder that there have been dismay, stumbling, and confusion! Small wonder that hard anti-Communists are not welcome at their side — for they were taught to regard all hard anti-Communists as “fascists at heart.”

The Washington atmosphere of these recent years was perfectly expressed by the highest foreign policy officer, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, when he declined to turn his back on a Soviet agent.\* This act was not isolated but typical. Acheson’s friends and associates, the members of his former

\* There would have been nothing to comment on if Acheson had been acting merely as an individual in relation to an individual friend, Alger Hiss. So to act, he would, of course, have had to resign as Secretary of State.

law firm (to which he returns whenever he is out of a government job), collected thousands of dollars for the Hiss defense funds, and still number Alger Hiss's brother Donald, accused by the same witness of the same acts, among their partners. At Washington dinners and cocktail parties held or attended by State Department and intelligence officials, no bitterness or contempt was ever expressed against Alger Hiss. At those same gatherings no vile and shameless slander against Whittaker Chambers was omitted.

IN ESTIMATING basic attitudes, psychology suggests as the most accurate rule: by their emotions shall ye know them. Whom does a man hate, whom does he love, at what is he bitter, toward whom tolerant? George Kennan is unquestionably anti-Soviet and from a rational standpoint anti-Communist. Nowhere in his published writings, however, does one ever find expressed in the texture of his style a powerful emotion concerning Communism, a hatred of Communism. The analysis and rejection, which are there, are always pale and abstract. Yet Kennan does express emotion in his writing, sometimes strongly. This emotion is invariably directed against the same target — the “politicians, commentators, and publicity-seekers of all sorts” who offer “counsels of impatience and hatred” in place of the “counsels of

moderation . . . deluging in noise and filth anyone who gets in their way . . . fanning . . . mass emotions and . . . sowing . . . bitterness, suspicion, and intolerance”:\* in less fancy words, the anti-Communist critics of the Acheson regime in the State Department.

In the Acheson climate the winds were predictable. It could always be foretold that they would blow cold and stormy against those who instituted and conducted, against any “friendly” witness who aided, the Internal Security Subcommittee’s steady probing into the Communist and pro-Communist infiltration of American life, against the ex-Communists who gave direct and sorrowful testimony to the working of the world conspiracy. Equally certain were the soft breezes of excuse, “explanation,” tolerant defense or easy denial for a William Remington (convicted of perjury for denying that he was a Communist, and up for retrial on a technicality) or a John Stewart Service (indicted in the *Amerasia* theft of classified government documents and finally in 1952 dismissed from the State Department by order of the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board).

The American foreign policy of the anti-Nazi epoch, which has carried over into the early years of the anti-Communist age, has another characteristic that bears on the possibility of effective political war-

\* *American Diplomacy, 1900-50*, p. 62.

fare. The policy has been conducted without *honor*. There are some who say that honor in politics went out with feudalism, and breathed its last when faithless Louis XI beat the chivalric Charles of Burgundy. Surely there has been a post-Renaissance honor that lasted, if with deviations, well into the nineteenth century, and has not yet wholly disappeared from the world. The recent directors of American foreign policy, however, do not seem to recognize any claims of honor.

CONSIDER, for example, American relations with France from 1940-47. Who was one's friend, ally, colleague? Pétain for a while, according to all official behavior. Then Giraud. Then Giraud ditched for Darlan. Then Darlan renounced in *memoir*, and De Gaulle "used" for his influence on the growing Resistance and as a symbol of the French nation. And then, after he had "served his purpose," the stubbornly unservile De Gaulle thrown aside for the more flexible-kneed socialists and centrists of the postwar "Third Force." Or think of Draja Mihailovitch, the first in Yugoslavia to fight for freedom and the West, against both forms of totalitarianism. American money and arms were diverted to the Communist terrorist, Tito, to help him subvert, defame, and murder Mihailovitch.

What of Angus Ward, stalwart member of the government's own

Foreign Service, who after rotting a year in Chinese Communist custody was banished by Acheson to Africa? Or William Oatis, permitted without reprisal to be framed and jailed by Czech Communists, and left to grow old in prison while Czech diplomats continue to be received at the White House? Or the thousands — literally thousands — of other Americans in Communist jails and slave camps? What of the dozens of Berlin anti-Communists who, kidnapped by Soviet agents from their homes in the United States sector, vanish forever into the torture cells of the Communist zone? What of General Anders, who formed and led the Polish Third Army out of the depths of Russia, through the Middle East, to the slopes of Monte Cassino and the Gothic Line? and General Bor-Komorowski, the leader of the incredible Warsaw rising deliberately sabotaged by the Red Army at the city gates? These Poles are outcasts, while the leaders of the United States government drink and eat and confer with Moscow's Polish stooges.

Would it not have been found unseemly by our grandfathers that American leaders should negotiate, discuss, and shake hands with the same men who in their next breath defile the air with their tales of "American germ warfare" and "medical experiments"?

Machiavelli insisted that "states

are not run by prayerbooks," and I do not wish to pretend that a modern government in the complex modern world can act like a Don Quixote on the bright field of honor. But honor still has a place in the relations among human beings. You can buy agents, but not friends or allies or comrades; and when you buy you always risk being outbid. If the United States is to succeed in political warfare against Soviet Communism, it must have friends who are firm under all circumstances, even the blackest, who are ready to go through to the end. Surely a man of honor is most likely to find

such friends. If we do not ourselves honor our own words, who will honor them?

I CONCLUDE this inquiry into the question whether the United States can conduct effective anti-Communist political warfare with doubt. The human and material resources are available. But it is not clear whether the nation possesses the necessary temperament, insight, and will. Of one conclusion we may be certain: political warfare, dynamically carried out and vast in scale, is the only alternative to unlimited nuclear war.

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## ***Containment — 1917***

» Washington was bewildered, confused, and angered by the Bolshevik coup. Rather than shake itself awake and come to grips with reality, the Administration at first tried to ignore the existence of Lenin's government. But the failure of the counterattacks by Kerensky and the Moscow Committee of Safety indicated that the Bolsheviks could not be wished away. Yet the policy ultimately formulated by Washington was based in part on the assumption that Lenin would miraculously disappear, and that the Soviet Government would — because it should — collapse.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, *in* AMERICAN RUSSIAN RELATIONS (1781-1947), Rinehart & Co., New York, 1952.